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PEOPLE V THOMPSON1
(decided November 14, 2002)
I. SYNOPSIS
In a unanimous decision, the New York Court of Appeals af-
firmed the Appellate Division, First Department, 2 and upheld the
conviction of defendant Jerome Thompson by the Supreme Court,
New York County, after he was found guilty in a jury trial. The
court of appeals reasoned that the credit card stolen by Thompson
was, indeed, a "credit card" within the meaning of both the New
York Penal Law § 155.003 and the General Business Law § 511, even
though it was technically a "dummy" credit card issued solely for
use in undercover sting operations. 4 Because the card fell within
the definition of these statutes, the court upheld the elevation of
the conviction to grand larceny in the fourth degree and criminal
possession of stolen property in the fourth degree.
5
II. BACKGROUND
Jerome Thompson, along with a co-defendant, was arrested in
December 1999 for stealing a decoy pocketbook from a police of-
ficer in Macy's Department Store in Herald Square in New York
City.6 An undercover female officer sat at the cosmetics counter
with a pocketbook hung over her chair.7 The defendant removed
the pocketbook from the chair and attempted to walk away and
leave the store. 8 Thompson was, at that time, arrested by other un-
dercover police officers.9
The pocketbook contained a "dummy" credit card, which was
to the New York City Police Department by American Express, spe-
1. 99 N.Y.2d 38 (2002).
2. People v. Thompson, 731 N.Y.S.2d 711 (App. Div. 2001).
3. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 155.00(7) (2002).
4. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw § 511(1) (2002).
5. Thompson, 99 N.Y.2d at 40.
6. Id.
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cifically for use in undercover sting operations.10 Although a false
name was imprinted on the credit card, the card was active and had
a valid credit line of $100.11
Thompson was found guilty by a jury in the Supreme Court,
New York County and was convicted of grand larceny in the fourth
degree, criminal possession of stolen property in the fourth degree,
and petit larceny. 12 Thompson appealed his conviction, and the
Appellate Division, First Department heard the case. 13
Thompson first claimed that because the credit card was a "de-
coy," it was not a "credit card" under New York Penal Law
§ 155.00(7), 14 which incorporates the definition of the General
Business Law § 511.15 Thompson also asserted that, since the card
holder was a fictitious person, the card was not "issued . . .to an-
other person" under the language of the General Business Law.
16
Lastly, the defendant contended that the terms of the statute were
not met because the police department and American Express
neither expected nor intended a credit relationship between
them. 1
7
The appellate division rejected Thompson's claims and upheld
the conviction. The court threw out Thompson's first claim and
reasoned that, since the card was valid and had a $100 credit line,
anyone who claimed to be the owner could successfully use the card
to make purchases.' 8 In other words, although it was not intended
for "regular" use but was instead intended for use in sting opera-
tions, it was still a valid credit card, capable of being used for the
purchase of goods or services. The court therefore reasoned that it
was indeed a valid credit card under the language of the statutes.
The appellate division next addressed the defendant's second
claim that the card was not "issued." The court cited the proper
definition of "issue" as set forth in Merriam-Webster's Collegiate
10. Thompson, 99 N.Y.2d at 40.
11. Id.
12. Thompson, 731 N.Y.S.2d at 712.
13. Id.
14. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 155.00(7) (2002).
15. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw § 511(1) (2002).
16. Thompson, 731 N.Y.S.2d at 712-713.
17. Id. at 713.
18. Id. at 712.
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Dictionary: "to put forth and distribute." 19 The court held that this
definition was satisfied because the card was, indeed, put forth and
distributed by American Express. Therefore, the court held that
the card was undoubtedly "issued" to the New York City Police
Department.
20
Lastly, the court analyzed the defendant's final claim that there
was no credit relationship between issuer and holder. The court
rejected this contention and highlighted the fact that criminal lia-
bility with respect to credit cards can arise even with regard to non-
activated, cancelled or expired cards. Thus, the court reasoned
that the statute did not require such a relationship 21 and cited Peo-
ple v. Radoncic22 and People v. Winfield 3 for authority. Under this
reasoning, the court held that the lack of a relationship between
the New York City Police Department and American Express was
irrelevant and rejected Thompson's claim. Thompson again
appealed.
III. DISCUSSION
The court of appeals defined the main issue as whether the
card constituted a "credit card" within the meaning of New York
Penal Law § 155.00(7)24 and General Business Law § 511,25 such
that its theft elevated Thompson's crime to grand larceny in the
fourth degree and criminal possession of stolen property in the
fourth degree. 26 Ultimately, the court answered this question af-
firmatively. From the outset, the court set forth the standard by
which Thompson's subjective mental state should be measured. 27
For this, the court relied on People v. Mitchell28 and stated that the
people need not show that Thompson knew the property was a
19. MERRIAM WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DIciONARY 622 (10th ed., 1995).
20. Thompson, 731 N.Y.S.2d at 713.
21. Id.
22. 687 N.Y.S.2d 141 (App. Div. 1999).
23. 535 N.Y.S.2d 619 (App. Div. 1988).
24. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 155.00(7) (2002).
25. N.Y. GEN. Bus. L.Aw § 511 (2002).
26. Thompson, 99 N.Y.2d at 40.
27. Id.
28. 77 N.Y.2d 624, 629 (1991).
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credit card. Rather, the court held that the state must prove only
that the property "in fact consisted of a credit card."
29
The court then examined the language of the applicable stat-
utes. 30 New York Penal Law § 155.00(7) states that a "credit card" is
any instrument or article defined as such in § 511 of the General
Business Law.31 General Business Law § 511 defines a "credit card"
as "any credit card, credit plate, charge plate, courtesy card... is-
sued by a person to another person which may be used to obtain a
cash advance or a loan or credit or to purchase or lease property or
services on the credit of the issuer or of the holder"3 2 (emphasis
added). Section 511 defines "person" as an individual, corporation,
partnership or association, two or more persons having a joint or
common interest or any other commercial or legal entity.
33
Additionally, the court relied on the trial testimony of an
American Express representative who claimed that, although the
card held a fictitious name, someone pretending to be that person
would have been able to purchase goods or services with the card.
Furthermore, if this happened, American Express would have been
liable to the vendor for that amount.34
Using this testimony coupled with the language of the statutory
provisions, the court found that the statutory requirements were
satisfied.3 5 The court stated, "[t]he card here was issued by a per-
son (American Express) to another person (the New York City Po-
lice Department) and was capable of being used. . to
purchase... property or services on the credit of the issuer."3 6 As
the statutory provisions were satisfied, the court held that the decoy
card was a valid credit card.
Moreover, to avoid any further confusion, the court, by way of
analogy, cited UCC 3-40511] [b] 37 and Getty Petroleum Corp. v. Ameri-
can Express Travel Related Service Co.38 to support the proposition that
29. Thompson, 99 N.Y.2d at 40.
30. Id.
31. N.Y. PENAL LAw § 155.00 (2002).
32. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw § 511(1) (2002).
33. Id. at § 511(2) (2002).
34. Thompson, 99 N.Y.2d at 41.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. U.C.C. § 3-405 (2002).
38. 90 N.Y.2d 322, 327 (1997).
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the mere naming of a fictitious payee in a negotiable instrument
does not, in and of itself, render the instrument invalid.3
9
The court then addressed and rejected Thompson's main
claim on this appeal, that the term "issue" should be given a mean-
ing other than the definition used by the appellate division. 40 The
defendant argued that the court of appeals should give the term
"issue" its technical meaning, as defined in Black's Law Dictionary
as "to send out or distribute officially"41 rather than the ordinary
dictionary meaning, "to put forth or distribute"42 as adopted by the
appellate division. The defendant further contended that the word
"officially" implied the necessity of a creation of an actual credit
relationship between issuer and holder. Such a relationship, he
claimed, was not present in the instant case.43
The court rejected Thompson's claim and cited McKinney's
Consolidated Laws of New York44 to demonstrate that the legislative
history of the statute neither suggests nor indicates that the legisla-
ture relied upon a particular "technical or special meaning" of the
term issue, instead of its everyday meaning.
The court also stressed that even if it were to allow the defini-
tion suggested by the defendant to control, the use of the adverb
"officially" to "modify the act of putting forth or distributing" does
not imply a relationship created between holder and issuer.45 The
court continued that since American Express generated an account
number and instituted a credit line that made it possible to obtain
goods, the card was "officially" created and distributed by American
Express.46 The court thus concluded that, adopting either defini-
tion, the card was satisfactorily "issued" to the New York City Police
Department by American Express.
47
Lastly, the court focused on the legislative history of General
Business Law § 511(1). 4 8 When originally created, § 511 stated, in
39. Thompson, 99 N.Y.2d at 42.
40. Id. at 41.
41. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 836 (7th ed. 1999).
42. MERRIAM WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 622 (10th ed., 1995).
43. Thompson, 99 N.Y.2d at 41.
44. Id. (citing McKinney's Cons. Laws of N.Y., Book I Statutes § 233).
45. Thompson, 99 N.Y.2d at 41.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 41-42.
48. Id. at 42.
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relevant part, "'credit card' means and includes any credit
card. . .or other. . .card or device issued by a person to another
person which authorizes the holder to obtain credit.
49
In 1970, however, the legislature changed the phrase "autho-
rizes the holder" to "may be used," thereby broadening the scope of
the statute. 50 Therefore, since the 1970 amendment, the statute
undoubtedly covers instances in which the card holder is not explic-
itly authorized to use the card, as long as the card could have possi-
bly been used as a credit card.5 1 Thus, the court refused to accept
the defendant's proposed interpretation because doing so would
effectively render the amendment a nullity, as it would return to the
pre-amendment version of the statute.
52
After considering all of Thompson's contentions, the New York
Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the appellate division,
which upheld the conviction of the defendant, Jerome Thompson.
This decision greatly impacts the ambit of the New York Penal
Law. Essentially, theft of any credit card, as long as it is active, re-
gardless of the reasons for which it was issued, and irrespective of
the defendant's subjective intent, will elevate the conviction to
grand larceny.
Furthermore, this decision clearly illustrates the weight the
court places on the legislative history of the statute. In doing so,
the court demonstrates the importance of not offending the
lawmakers' intent.
IV. CONCLUSION
The New York Court of Appeals upheld the conviction of the
defendant, Jerome Thompson, by the New York Supreme Court,
New York County, for the crime of grand larceny in the fourth de-
gree and criminal possession of stolen property in the fourth de-
gree. In doing so, the New York Court of Appeals supported the
reasoning of the Appellate Division, First Department, that the
credit card Thompson stole was, indeed, a "credit card" within the
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meaning of both the New York Penal Law § 155.00 and General
Business Law § 511.
Desha Slaght

